Foundation for Iranian Studies

Program of Oral History
INTERVIEWEE: JACK MIKLOS
INTERVIEWER: WILLIAM BURR
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA: JULY 28 and 31, 1986
and
June 21 and 30, 1988
PREFACE

This manuscript is the product of a series of tape-recorded interviews conducted for the Oral History of Iran Program of Foundation for Iranian Studies by William Burr with Jack Miklos in Oakland, Ca. in July 28 and 31, 1986 and June 21 and 30, 1988.

Readers of this Oral History memoir should bear in mind that it is a transcript of the spoken word, and that the interviewer, narrator and editor sought to preserve the informal, conversational style that is inherent in such historical sources. Foundation for Iranian Studies is not responsible for the factual accuracy of the memoir, nor for the views expressed therein.

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Dear Dr. Grele:

This letter will confirm my understanding and agreement with the Foundation for Iranian Studies Oral History of Iran Archives and Columbia University with respect to my participation in a series of interviews conducted by the Columbia University Oral History Research Office.

1. The interviews will be taped and a transcript made of the tapes. The transcribed interviews will be maintained by the Oral History of Iran Archives and the Columbia Oral History Research Office.

2. I hereby grant, assign and transfer to the Oral History of Iran Archives all right, title and interest in the interviews, including the literary rights and the copyright, except that I shall retain the right to copy, use and publish the Work in part or in full until the earlier of my death or ______________ 19__.

3. The interviews will be made available for use by researchers at both institutions in accordance with Foundation and University rules and general policies for research and other scholarly purposes with (no) (the following) restrictions.

Very truly yours,

[Signature]

Dr. Mahnaz Afkhami
Foundation for Iranian Studies

[Signature]

Ronald Grele
Oral History Research Office

Date Aug 3, 1987

Jack Miklos
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Jack Miklos joined the Foreign Service in 1949 after
serving at the Pacific front in World War II. He was
first assigned to Iran in 1957. In 1960 he was appointed
to Iran's Desk at the State Department. Between 1967
and 1974 he served as the Country Director for Iran at
the State Department, and from 1974 until 1978 he acted
as the Deputy Chief of U.S. Mission in Tehran under
Ambassadors Helms and Sullivan. He was later appointed
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asia
at the State Department, and following his career at the
State Department he has acted as a research fellow at
the National Defense College.
CORRECTION LIST

P.7 reserved should be reserved
P.11 Mossadegh should be Mossadeq
P.14 Teheran should be Tehran
P.17 Savak should be SAVAK
P.29 Abol Hassan should be Abol-Hasan
P.40 Khodad Farman Farmayan should be Khodadad Farmanfarmaiyan
P.40 Moqadam should be Moqaddam
P.42 national front should be National Front
PP.53-54 Ali Amini should be Ali Amini
P.56 Ansary should be Ansari
P.66 Amir Abbas Hoveida should be Amir Abbas Hoveida
P.85 Khadafy should be Qaddafi
P.86 Emir should be Amir
P.99 Shah-en-Shah should be Shahanshah
PP.105-106 Ansary should be Ansari
P.105 Aslam Afshar should be Aslan Afshar
P.109 Assadollah should be Asadollah
P.129 Ansary should be Ansari
P.129 Hoveida should be Hoveida
P.137-139 Houssain Toufaniyan should be Hasan Tufaniyan
P.138 Van Marbo should be Von Marbod
PP.143-144 Bahrein should be Bahrain
P.155 Ansary should be Ansari
P.184 Sullian should be Sullivan
P.217 Meshed should be Mashhad
P.239 Bakhtiar should be Bakhtiyar
ALM

Interviewee: Jack Miklos  Date: July 28, 1986
Interview: William Burr  Place: Oakland, CA.

Q: The following interview with Jack Miklos, by William Burr, took place in Oakland, California on July 28, 1986. The interview is a joint project with the Columbia University Oral History research office and the Foundation for Iranian Studies.

Mr. Miklos, before we get to your involvement with Iran I'd like to ask you some questions about your background. Where were you born, and raised?

Miklos: I was born in Moscow, Idaho. I was raised in the northwest, in Spokane and Lewiston, Idaho. I went to school mostly in Spokane, Gonzaga University, where I got a Liberal Arts Degree.

Q: That's in Idaho also?

Miklos: No. Gonzaga University, Spokane--Spokane, Washington. Like many young men of any generation I went in to the military during World War II, which developed my interest in foreign affairs, you might say. I found myself in Japan in the army of occupation at the end of World War II--I was with the military government, briefly--and decided that I wasn't quite ready to come back to the United States yet. I began to look for something to do in Japan, if
possible. The military were bringing people out to teach other military—civilian courses, regular school courses of various kinds, an educational program for G.I.s and others still there. I thought that that might be something I could do. But they said that "No, they weren't recruiting in the country, and if I wanted to do that I'd have to go back to the United States and apply and take my chances." But they mentioned that a political advisor to the Allied Commander was looking for somebody in Yokohama. Well, I stopped off at, what was in effect, the Consulate—although it wasn't called that in those days—in Yokohama, where I met Alex Johnson, who subsequently was ambassador to Japan. He was, in effect, the Consul General. We talked about the Foreign Service, and it seemed like something that was very interesting. I didn't think of it necessarily as a career but as something that I might do for a while, anyhow, if I could. So, in effect, I joined up there.

I met my wife in Japan. One thing lead to another, and I never left the Foreign Service.

We left Japan in 1949. In those days, there was a rule in the Foreign Service that if you or some immediate member of your family had been closely associated with a country—a foreign country—you couldn't be stationed there. There was some suspicion that somehow or another your judgment might be hindered by past associations. My wife had been born and raised in Japan, although she left just before World War I—'I'm sorry, World War II—and was back there with Military Intelligence after World War II. They said, "Well, that is a rule." So they sent us to Morocco. That's how I began my career, you might say, in the Middle East, which was then a part of the Near
East and South Asian affairs, a division of the State Department which you probably know about. I spent my entire career since 1949 in that rather large geographic part of the world, which stretches from Morocco all the way through Bangladesh.

As far as further education is concerned, in 1959 I got a sabbatical, so to speak, and got a Masters in political science and economics at Stanford University. There were a few other training courses of one sort or another that were "in house", you might say, at the foreign service institute. But no other formal education.

I spent five plus years in Morocco. We then went to Istanbul. In 1957 we were assigned to Tehran for the first time. I was in Tehran from 1957 to 1959 before coming back to Stanford for my advanced degree. After concluding that, in the fall of 1960, I was assigned to the Iranian Desk in the State Department, where I was until, let's see--I believe it was 1963 when I was assigned to the Consulate General in Bombay, India. I was the Deputy Consul General there for four years. Then I was assigned as Deputy Chief of Mission to our embassy in Ceylon, now Sri Lanka, where I spent a couple of years.

Which takes us up to 1969, when I came back to Washington as Country Director for Iran. I was Country Director until 1974, when I was assigned to Tehran again this time as the Deputy Chief Mission. I was there from 1974 to 1978, when I came back to Washington as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian affairs, but with basic responsibility for the subcontinent--not for Iran, that is Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Seychelles. That was the area--the eastern most end of the Near East and South Asian
affairs, let's put it that way.

That in brief was my career.

Q: Okay, that's a perspective to start with. Now, in terms of your first initial involvement in Iran in the late 1950s--1957?

Miklos: 1957 to 1959.

Q: 1959.

Miklos: I was economic officer there. I mainly followed what the Plan Organization was trying to do both in terms of planning as well as implementation. That really covered the economic life of the country, so to speak, in so far as government was concerned. We had a large aid mission there, Point Four, I guess it was called in those days. Its programs were hopefully fitted in with what the Plan Organization was trying to do, or what other Iranian government agencies were trying to do as well. It wasn't a wholly tidy situation, nor were things always totally coordinated. There was always struggle between the government ministries and the Plan Organization over not only planning, but over budget, allocation of resources, etc. But reporting and analysis of this area of activity was my main responsibility during that period.

Q: I have some questions about that. But I thought I'd ask some sort-of general questions about Iran during that period, the state of politics and economics generally, and then we can focus on the
foreign aid programs or the Plan Organization and their interrelationships, I suppose.

During the late 1950s when you were in Tehran, what was your impression of the political, I guess, and economic situation of the country. What was your assessment of the state of affairs there.

Miklos: Well it was still very much a third world country. Quite poor, and certainly if one traveled as I did—not extensively, but from time to time out in the countryside—why, you saw that it was a very poor country. Communications were poor, the roads were poor, electricity was lacking in a good part of the country. The distribution system was primitive. Government reach was still rather tenuous in certain parts of the country. Tribal chieftans were still to be reckoned with. I would say it was still in a process of consolidation, both economically and politically. The Shah was in charge—I think that was fairly clear. But there were other influential, in political and economic terms, personalities as well as groups that had to be taken in to account in anything that you were trying to do. This led, as a matter of fact, to a certain amount of frustration because there were these contending forces. While the Plan Organization might like things to happen, they weren't necessarily possible from an economic or political point of view because of these contending factions, and forces.

Q: Could you define them, those factions and forces?

Miklos: Some were notable families, which historically were
important because of their wealth in the land. Generally within the government, why you found this reflected. Prominent families occupying prominent positions, with some feeling that they had a sovereign right to say what they said, or do what they did. The military, which was being developed by the government, was also of some importance. The gendarmerie was of importance. Governors, even though appointed by the Shah, were not always but were sometimes appointed because they were prominent in the region they were appointed governor to—for other reasons, for family reasons. I will say this, that religious personalities were not, in my perception anyhow, were not considered to be particularly important. They were there—there's no doubt about that. Some of them were certainly respected for their learning. Many were not. Many were considered ignorant, backward, and as a matter of fact an impediment to modernization and development. That was a theme that was certainly true over the period that I was associated with Iran. The Iranians themselves frequently made jokes about the Mullahs, how corrupt they were, how stupid they were, etc. This was not outsiders observations—as I say there were a lot of local jokes.

Q: You probably didn't meet the Shah during this period. Did you ever get any impressions of him?

Miklos: I first met the Shah outside of the country, when he was on a visit to Turkey—on a state visit to Turkey and I was included in a couple of receptions for him.
Q: This is in 1960 some time?

Miklos: 1955. But it was just a meeting.

When I was first in Iran, the impression was--he was a lot more open, I would say. He used to ride around in his car, drive his own car around northern Tehran and Shemiran. He would pass and wave to the people, that sort of thing. It wasn't a big deal. He was fairly reserved, as he'd always been subsequently in his formal meetings with foreign officials, and certainly with our ambassador. He was not, in his official relationships he was not a genial man. He was, as I say, rather reserved and formal. But, he liked to have a good time. I remember, a nightclub in Shemiran that occasionally he would take over. Rezi Ghadsol it was called. One night my wife and I wanted to go there and there were bodyguards all around the place, and they said "No, it's not open for business tonight!" The Shah was in there, having a good time. So I mean he had a human side, I suppose that is what I'm saying--a very human side. So that's my general impressions of him as a person at that period of time.

I don't know that he had fully thought through all of the things that were to come. But he was--I think he was fixed on a couple of basic points. One was that if he could, he was going to drag the country in to the twentieth century, probably kicking and screaming most of the way. That he was going to extend the reach of government to all parts of the country, one way or another. In terms of the politics of it, I think he really wasn't quite sure how he was going to do that. You know, he was educated in Switzerland so he had the--I think--some bias towards some type of democratic, or
multi-sided, political system. But he also was very, very Persian in that he—I think—he understood his people pretty well, and that this would be a basic consideration. He certainly was not prepared to leap head-long in to a full-blown Jeffersonian democracy. It was something that had to evolve. Precisely how it was going to evolve was something, simply, that he wasn't quite sure about. It was I think, as I recall, a two-party system that was sort-of artificial at that point. There were some other minor parties. The Communists, as I recall, had been outlawed—I mean it was in the law. But, there were some other groups that were sort-of operating not terribly successfully.

Q: In terms of opposition.

Miklos: In terms of opposition and so forth. It was sort-of a "shadow" government, if you will. Not a full-blown one though.

Q: In terms of U.S. foreign policy during this period, how would you define the approach that Dulles or Eisenhower took towards Iran. What was your sense of the basic thrust of policy at this period?

Miklos: Well I think various administrations of that period and really up until the seventies—of course right after World War II there was just getting the Russians out of Northern Iran, trying to ensure the integrity of the country as a whole, and permitting and enabling it to develop economically, as well as politically. I would say there was sort-of three major themes. One was the ability to
defend itself at least for a short period of time—"trip-wire" was the term we often used in talking about the development of the Iranian military along the northern border with the Soviet Union—to give it the ability to hold on until help could come, so to speak. If I remember correctly we raised the nuclear umbrella over Iran. I'm not sure—I'd have to do a little research whether this was embodied in a formal agreement or whether it was sort-of a given.

Q: In terms of war planning? That was the assumption that if there was a war—.

Miklos: No. No. Not in terms of that. More in terms of the nature of our relationship, and that was sort-of we would defend Iran with whatever means was necessary. So there, I think, was an implicit if not explicit understanding that in the final analysis if this were necessary, so on and so forth. I'm sorry I can't remember whether, as I say, this was embedded in some formal document or whether it was just an understanding, so to speak.

In any event, territorial integrity and independence was one of the major themes. Economic development, helping it to help itself develop. Just right across the spectrum—from agriculture to public health, communications, ports and harbors, electricity, whatever. In so far as politics were concerned, a major theme—and I think this was stated pretty explicitly to the Shah from time to time. I don't know that any president ever said this, but certainly his ambassadors were instructed to urge the Shah to reign but not rule, was sort-of the theme. Again I don't know that we ever said, "That's what you
ought to do", but implied, you know, "loosen the system up and make sure that more people are participating in the political process, and keep yourself at some distance from this if you can." Well, this changed of course from I guess around the beginning of the 1970s, early 1970s anyhow. While, of course, independence and national integrity was still a major theme it took on a different dimension in that because of the build-up that had gone on through the years--military build-up--and Iran's growing ability not only to defend itself but to in fact project itself militarily into the near-by area, and the United States itself withdrawing, somewhat, in terms of what we could do, of what we thought we could do abroad. Of course this all fits in with the Vietnam syndrome and all of that. But, there were changed perceptions of the nature of the relationship and the roles that--speaking about the United States and Iran--that each would play in security terms.

There was also a change in the nature of the relationship in so far as economic development was concerned. It was no longer a petitioner for aid. Of course after the oil shut off and so forth it came in to--for a while--enormous sums of money, and it was quite independent. As a matter of fact, there were various occasions where we would urge Iran to provide aid to other countries which we felt was in U.S. and Iranian mutual interests. And they responded. Although, sometimes in an amusing way. I recall when we were hard-pressed to get the Congress to appropriate this sum that we would hope they would for aid, for example, for Egypt. So we urged Iran to help out. They sent well sort-of aid in-kind, taking a page from our own aid programs that they'd learned so well from us, which
wasn't quite what we had in mind. [laughs] There wasn't a lot we could say about their approach, because it was one that we'd taken ourselves.

Q: So back to the 1950s again--maybe all the way through the period. In what ways was Iran sort-of important. Or was it in terms of a strategic situation, or petroleum, or a mixture of those two things?

Miklos: Well. Petroleum was a consideration. I don't think that it loomed as large as many people thought not acquainted with Iran or with that part of the world or with the oil question itself--which wasn't really a question in those days, per se. There were questions about nationalization, of course, before that--Iran, remember, was the first country to nationalize, in Mossadegh days--and this upset the oil companies. But in terms of U.S. foreign policy per se, it was not a major question because we did not get that much oil from Iran. Iran was seen as part of the containment of Soviet expansion. So, it was from a strategic more than any other point of view that we viewed Iran. Of course Iran viewed us as a major benefactor, as a protector, and in some degree as a model. Not necessarily politically, but in terms of a dynamic economy, growing rapidly, producing all sorts of material benefits. This was something to be admired and hopefully emulated.

Q: Now, in terms of Iran's location was, it was considered to be partly important because of the fact that it was like a barrier between the Soviet Union to the north and the oil fields of Saudi
Arabia. Was there some kind of, like sort-of a barrier?

Miklos: That was certainly a consideration—an important consideration. I'm not sure that that was necessarily stated that way, as we wrote hundreds if not thousands of studies about goals and objectives, and means, and country papers, and I'm sure you're familiar with Washington bureaucracy by now. This stuff was turned out by various organizations—principally the State Department, but a lot of others. But yes, barrier. As I say a big part of the containment policy that it stood in the way of the oil fields in Saudi Arabia, yes. But if there had been no oil fields in Saudi Arabia I think it still would have been a consideration in strategic terms.

Q: Was there a fear of a military attack or was it more of a political question, the role of the Soviet Union. What did they actually fear at the time?

Miklos: I think there was a very real concern that the Soviets might take direct military action against them. This was a fear that the Soviets did not go to pains to disabuse them of. In research you probably came across the treaty between the Soviet Union and Iran with a clause which in effect said that if—I wish I could remember the precise terms—but opened the door to Soviet military intervention if the situation in Iran developed in such a way that might be threatening to the Soviet Union. The Soviets—sometimes not very delicately—suggested that the American military presence in
Iran was a threat to the Soviet Union, and they may have to do something about it. Now, I think at one point they even cited a particular clause in this treaty between Iran and the Soviet Union as the basis for their intervention. So yes there was a real concern.

Q: This is the late 1950s we're talking about, basically.

Miklos: Well, it continued. It was something that never diminished per se. Of course it was the basis for, not necessarily everything, but a good part of what the Shah did in terms of developing his military and justifying it.

Q: I have a couple more questions about the political situation, but I think I want to ask: During the late 1950s there were two ambassadors to Iran. For the U.S. Selden Chapin, was the first one, and then Edward [Tom] Wailes. I guess Chapin was from 1955 to 1958. Do you have any reflections on Chapin that you--?

Miklos: Yes. Well he was there, I guess, about five months of the time I was there, and then he left and there was, as usual, maybe a two month interregnum and then Tom Wailes came. My impressions of Chapin are a little fuzzy. He was--of course I was a quite junior officer in a fairly large mission, so the distance between us was considerable. I didn't see an awful lot of him--large staff meetings I would see him. But I can't recall really ever doing business directly with him. My business was with the economic counselor and occasionally with the DCM, but little or none with the ambassador
himself. He was a old-style ambassador you might say—which I had by then come to know—and behaved accordingly. Somewhat removed from the troops going about whatever he did.

Tom Wailes was also an old-style ambassador, but with a different personality. More open, and certainly socially we saw more of Wailes. Of course we were there together longer. But he had come there, as you may remember, he had been appointed--nominated--ambassador to one of the Eastern European countries. He had been declared *persona non grata* for one, and refused entry or something like that--I forget the details precisely. Anyhow, Tom was mainly a European person up until then. So I don't recall that Tom knew an awful lot about the Middle East, certainly not through any direct service. But he got along very well with the Iranians, and he was as I say a very genial person, open and friendly, charming wife and so forth. The only specific incident I can ever recall vis a vis Tom was--well, the context. Remember after World War II the American military had a great deal of influence, which carried over in to the foreign affairs field. We had a large military mission in Teheran. There were several incidents--I don't recall the details per se—but the nature of which suggested that the head of the military group there was really getting out of line vis a vis the ambassador and the ambassador's authority. Several of us saw this and urged Tom to put his foot down about this, and get this cleared up. If the guy wasn't going to shape out get him out of the country or let him know that his behavior was unacceptable. Which he did.
Q: Was this over a policy issue, or just over--?

Miklos: In part a policy issue, but in part this fellow's interaction with the Iranian government where he was, as I say, just getting out of hand, out in front you might say. Again I don't remember precise details, but I think it was something he shouldn't have even been involved with, and wasn't his business.

This was of course a constant problem, and particularly when I was there as DCM. Not necessarily something that was done in any necessarily willful way. It was just, you know, these guys were generals, used to command, and behaving in certain ways, and it wasn't easy for them to operate when necessary within a--we call it--a civilian country team. My job--one of my major jobs--was keeping everybody marching to the same tune.

Q: Who were some of the other influentials at the embassy? Did you have an economics counselor that you worked with?

Miklos: The AID director played a significant role in the implementation of our policy, and to a certain degree, formulation--certainly in so far as the AID program is concerned, and that was an important aspect of our overall relationship with the country.

Q: Can you tell me who that was, the head of the AID?

Miklos: Harry Brenn is the name that comes to mind. There were two
when I was there. Harry was there most of the time I was there--this is the 1950s now we're talking about. Harry was a successful rancher-farmer in Idaho in an earlier reincarnation. I think he had been in one or two other countries with the AID program before coming to Iran. His deputy Morey [Maurice] Williams, I remember him, who later went on to be the head of the AID program in Washington itself. I think there were some other steps in between but he ended up in a very senior position.

Well Phil Clock was there, our political counselor, the head of the advisory group to the Gendarmerie, which later had an important role in terms of our relations with the internal working of the Gendarmerie, the national police, and so forth.

Q: This is military person, an American officer?

Miklos: Yes. He was colonel. Traditionally a colonel with the infantry, as a matter of fact.

Let's see. Those were the--in so far as our mission was concerned--those were the key players.

Q: Gratian Yatsevitch. Was he head of the CIA mission at that time?

Miklos: Gratian Yatsevitch, yes. He was a Station Chief, yes. I'm sorry--I don't know why I forgot about Gratian. Didn't really forget about him, but I didn't remember him. Yes. Gratian was an important player, too.
Q: I've heard his name before so I wanted to ask about him.

Miklos: Yes.

Q: Did you get a sense of what they were doing in Iran at the time? Was that sort-of closed to you?

Miklos: Oh! Bits and pieces. I think it was very obvious to anybody who worked in the embassy who had any sensitivity at all. Of course we all knew that the CIA was there, and we knew who they were, and what their cover was. As far as the detail of what they were doing, not very much. Some of the bits of analysis, internal political, economic conditions. We would know about that, and as a matter of fact hopefully there would be some sort of coordination, although this again was sometimes a problem. Their views and views of other people in the embassy didn't necessarily coincide all the time. But then again that's a sort-of endemic problem with every mission. But I was not necessarily aware of anything much beyond that. I knew some of the contacts that they had in the Iranian government or even outside of the Iranian government. I stumbled across two, as I recall, who weren't in the embassy but who had covers outside of the embassy. They were embarrassed about that.

Q: Did you know anything about their role in training Savak, or was that pretty much the secret at that time?

Miklos: Certainly we knew of the connection. Again, not anything
really in terms of detail.

Q: I guess during the 1950s they had a fairly large network of Iranian agents on the scene in Tehran and elsewhere. Did you essentially still have a network in place? Or had it been phased out?

Miklos: I would say that probably in terms of sheer numbers, there were more people, more contacts, in the late 1950s early 1960s than there was in the 1970s. There were a number of assets, I suppose, or that was what they were called. We really didn't--who were just sort-of there. They weren't active ties, but were something to go wrong, they were hopefully to be an asset. Those kind of relationships, I suspect.

But I think the CIA mission was somewhat different in the 1970s than it was earlier. Their interest was, in the 1970s, internal development, yes, but less than that than the external side and recruitment of third country defectors.

Q: How much concern was there in this period about the stability of the Shah's regime? Was there much apprehension?

Miklos: It varied considerably among observers, and even within the Embassy. You talk about CIA. There were some of the CIA guys who, I think, you know who thought the place was going to go to hell in a hand basket the next day. I can remember a couple of instances where we had a fairly lively exchange of opinion on that. There were
others that didn't see it that way. There was a considerable amount of on-going debate amongst ourselves as well as with outsiders about this. So as I say there was considerable variation. There was never any feeling of total confidence in those days, that you know everything was okay and you could just sit back and relax. No, nobody ever thought that.

End Side One, Cassette One
Begin Side Two, Cassette One

Q: When you and other embassy officials discussed the question of instability during this period, what were some of the concerns that officials had? Did they fear a popular uprising possibility, or was there more concern about a military coup? What were some of these things?

Miklos: Yes. Well as I said, there were different perspectives on the question of instability and its causes. Some were concerned about the possibility of the military taking over. Others could develop or did develop the argument that the communists might take advantage of dissatisfaction, and infiltrate—as indeed they had the military at one point—and other institutions. They might mount an effective challenge to the regime. There were other less focused concerns about just general discontent of the people over their status in life; poor, hungry, didn't have all the things they came to know were available to other people and to other countries—the familiar rising expectation argument. Then there was the overthrow
of the monarchy in Iraq. This caused a considerable amount of concern in certain quarters over whether there would be a demonstration effect or a slipp-over effect into Iran, worry as to whether the same thing could happen there. You asked whether this concerned the Shah or not, and I would say "Yes, I'm sure it did." How concerned he was I don't know. But, obviously something that happened to a fellow monarch and somebody right on his border was something that would worry anybody.

All the people that I talked to at my level had expressed concern over the effect this might have on Iran, internally as well as externally. Aside from the fact that Iraq and Iran were never close friends—although they both were members of the Baghdad Pact, as it was called in those days. But that was sort-of on a monarch to monarch level, and didn't find any real resonance in the populations of the two countries.

Q: When you assessed the situation yourself in this period did you share those apprehensions about instability or were you more optimistic?

Miklos: I felt more optimistic. My perspective, of course, was as an economic officer. What was happening—I thought mainly what was happening in so far as the economy is concerned was cause for some measured optimism. I was not totally Mary Poppins, but I felt they were making progress on a variety of fronts—that the standard of living in fact was improving. They had tremendous problems—land reform, for example. It's all right to say you're going to give land