INTERVIEWEE: ARCHIE BOLSTER
INTERVIEWER: WILLIAM BURR

WASHINGTON, D.C.: FEBRUARY 23, MARCH 24, MAY 3, 1988
PREFACE

The following oral history memoir is the result of one tape-recorded interview session with Archie Bolster on February 23, 1988, March 24, 1988, and May 3, 1988. The interview was conducted by William Burr.

This interview is one of a series on Iranian-American relations in the post-World War II era which were conducted as part of a joint project between the Oral History of Iran Archives of the Foundation for Iranian Studies and the Columbia University Oral History Research Office. Similar projects have been undertaken in England and France.

Mr. Bolster has reviewed the transcript and made corrections and emendations. The reader is asked to bear in mind, however, that he or she is reading a verbatim transcript of spoken, rather than written, prose.
Form H

Dear Dr. Grele:

This letter will confirm my understanding and agreement with the Foundation for Iranian Studies Oral History of Iran Archives and Columbia University with respect to my participation in a series of interviews conducted by the Columbia University Oral History Research Office.

1. The interviews will be taped and a transcript made of the tapes. The transcribed interviews will be maintained by the Oral History of Iran Archives and the Columbia Oral History Research Office. A copy will be provided to me without charge.

2. I hereby grant, assign and transfer to the Oral History of Iran Archives all right, title and interest in the interviews, including the literary rights and the copyright, except that I shall retain the right to copy, use and publish the Work in part or in full until the earlier of my death or September 1, 1998.

3. The interviews will be made available for use by researchers at both institutions in accordance with Foundation and University rules and general policies for research and other scholarly purposes with (the following) restrictions: permission to make direct quotes from the material must be approved by me.

Dr. Mahnaz Afkhami
Foundation for Iranian Studies

Very truly yours,

Ronald Grele
Oral History Research Office

Date August 31, 1988
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Archie Bolster first went to Iran as a child in pursuance to his father mission to Iran. I later years he returned to Iran as a diplomat, and was stationed first in Tabriz and later at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Bolster's long stationings in Iran has provided him with a rare intimate knowledge of the workings of Iranian politics, U.S.-Iranian relations and the workings of the Embassy in Tehran. Bolster's experiences with Iran have moreover provided him with first-hand knowledge of the White Revolution of 1963 and the developments in Iranian agriculture, the events of 1963-64 in Iran, and the extent of political analysis conducted at the American Embassy in Tehran.
CORRECTIONS

Throughout the text Azerbaijan should be Azabayjan

Pages 6 and 185 Mossadegh should be Mossadeq
Page 7 No-ruz should be Nowruz
Page 20 Marageh should be Maragheh
Page 20 Ali should be ʿAlī
Page 50 Hossain should be Hosein
Page 51 Cyrus Qani should be Sīrus Ghani
Page 56 Hassan Ali should be Hasan ʿAlī
Page 57 Amir Abbas Hoveida should be Amir ʿAbbas Hoveyda
Page 70 Shapur Bakhtiyar should be Shapur Bakhtiyar
Pages 71-72 Qotsi should be Qodsi
Page 86 Qotsi should be Qodsi
Page 86 Bakhtiyar should be Bakhtiyar
Page 86 Mozaffa Bagai should be Mozaffar Baqaʾi
Page 87 Mogadam-Maraghei should be Moqaddam Maragheʾī
Page 89 Mogadam should be Moqaddam
Page 91 TOFIQ should be Towfiq
Page 112 Khaibar Khan should be Kheybar Khan
Page 113 Goodarzian should be Gudarziyan
Page 114 Goodarzi should be Gudarziyan
Page 163 Qotsi should be Qodsi
Page 164 TOFIQ should be Towfiq
Page 171 Ziaʾī should be Zīyaʾī
Page 184 Maraghei should be Maragheʾī
Page 185 Qotsi should be Qodsi
Page 192 Elbure should be Alborz
Page 204 Alee should be Al-e
Pages 204 and 206 Ali Shariati should be ʿAlī Shariʿatī
Pages 205-206 Ziaʾī should be Zīyaʾī
Page 210 No-ruz should be Nowruz
Page 235 Mogaddam should be Moqaddam
Page 239 Azmoudeh should be Azmudeh
VA
Interviewee: Archie Bolster
Interviewer: William Burr
February 23, 1988

Q: The following interview with Archie Bolster by William Burr took place in Arlington, Virginia on February 23, 1988. The interview is part of a joint project by the Columbia University Oral History Research Office and the Foundation for Iranian Studies.

Mr. Bolster, tell me a little bit about your background. Where were you born and raised?

Bolster: I was born in Iowa and grew up in Montana, but when I was a relatively young twelve-year-old I went off to live in Iran with my father, who was the first agricultural attache in Iran after the war. We arrived in Tehran in January of 1946, having come through Port Said and Cairo, and flown up there on military planes. So I had that two and a half year experience as a young boy, leaving there in '48 and then going to live in Holland after that, where again my father was an agricultural attache.

So when I graduated from high school, after returning from Holland, I had one year in Massachusetts and then decided to pursue a Foreign Service career. So I studied Foreign Relations at the University of Virginia, in what they had at that time dubbed as their School of Foreign Affairs.
I went through the Navy program, Naval ROTC, so that as soon as I graduated I had to serve my three years in the Navy. So I had active duty on a destroyer and went to the Mediterranean a couple of times. So I had some further travels, and during that time I took the Foreign Service exam and I joined the Foreign Service just after I came out. I left the Navy in June of '58 and joined in July of '58. Went through training and then had a special training in being a disbursing officer, which was rather an unusual type of job for a Foreign Service officer. Then I went off to Phnom Penh, Cambodia as my first post.

I came back from there in 1960, after somewhat less than a full tour, because I was ordered to language training at FSI [Foreign Service Institute] for Persian language. And after finishing that, a full ten-month course, after which I scored very well in the FSI system, I went off to my first post in Iran as a Foreign Service officer, which was Tabriz. So that was July of 1961.

Q: Did you spend two and a half years in Iran? From '46 to--?

Bolster: '46 to '48, yes.

Q: You went to school?

Bolster: I went to the Community School in Tehran, which is quite an experience in itself, because there were some twenty-six
nationalities in the school. It was a real melting pot. But it was run by the missionaries and the whole course was in English.

So I really didn’t learn any Farsi to speak of. A few improper words [laughs] and some slang and some nouns and this and that, but a very mixed bag. So I really didn’t know that much Farsi. I recognized, of course, speech patterns and sounds and some of these things, which probably helped me a little bit, but it was a tough go learning Farsi from almost nothing in ten months.

But, you know, by the time I went out—the Foreign Service training I think was outstanding, because by the time I went out I could go into any situation and talk with people in Farsi, whether it was a taxi driver or a cabinet minister or whatever. Just go in and conduct the whole thing in Farsi and go back and write my report on the meeting in English. I could pick up a newspaper and read articles. Not as fast a I would in English, but I could quickly read the titles and decide which articles I wanted to read, and then go down and get key facts. If I needed something totally translated, then I would probably turn to the chief national employee and have him do it. But I could certainly read the papers and get what was going on.

In fact, I still remembered some of the lesson plans that we had. They were so well written. They’d been redone a few years before I took the course and they were so well written that they actually stuck with me and were used in situations. Like there was one on the call on the Governor-General. You used all the honorific terms and special high-flown Persian that you used with
a senior official, and phrases about his province and things you wanted to find out. So, on its own, it was just very useful and we employed these lessons all the time. So the training was really excellent.

Q: What were your impressions of Iran as a teen-ager?

Bolster: Well, I had pretty strong remembrances of it, because a lot of important things happened while I was there. I suppose, looking back on it, the most significant one was hearing George Allen make a speech to the Iran-American Society, at which he in so many words told the Iranians that we would support them in regaining their national territory, which was the signal that we were putting our weight behind the Iranians in getting Azerbaijan back. It was also a signal to the Soviets, who, as you recall, when the chips were down withdrew their support from [Jafar] Pishevari and Qazi Mohammad--Pishevari in Azerbaijan and Qazi Mohammad in the Republic of Mehabad. The Soviets pulled out their support as soon as they saw we were going to back the Iranians, and the Shah sent the troops in and there were casualties, but it was clearly a momentum on the side of the central government forces, because they were given the clear support of the U.S. government. I heard Allen give this talk, so even though I was young, it stuck with me.

Also, another time I was on a trip--about the same time, in fact, I was on a trip with my parents to Karaj, which was a town
northwest of Tehran, with an agricultural college. My Dad had a lot of activities there with the faculty and various people. And on one trip there, we were coming back and suddenly this military convoy was going toward Azerbaijan, with the trucks full of troops and towing howitzers and everything. That was the troop movement to Azerbaijan to regain the lost territory.

So that was quite an experience. My Dad experienced situations, too, like trying to go toward Azerbaijan, because he made all kinds of trips out in the countryside to look at the crops and estimate what their production would be for that year and so on. And the Soviets stopped him. I think that was in Qazvin.

Q: This was in early 1946, I guess?

Bolster: Yes. And the guard said, you can’t go any further. We’re not going to allow you to travel here. So, you know, that was quite an interesting period to be in the country.

Q: What were your impressions of—or your recollections of the state of development of the country, economically and socially?

Bolster: It was really very primitive at the time. I mean, I saw the first traffic control they had ever tried. It was simply a standard with red marks one way and green marks another way and the policeman would stand in the middle of the street and turn it
ninety degrees whenever he wanted the traffic to change. And people ignored him and just drove through anyway. You know-- I mean, when I first came there, the main means of transportation was by drushki, which was a horse-drawn carriage much like they have in some small Russian villages today. If you took a conveyance to go from here to there in Tehran, you took a drushki. The whole appearance of the place had quite a similarity to parts of southern Russia. You know, the buildings were not unlike the buildings in Armenia or that sort of thing.

So it was quite a strong experience. For example, going to Isfahan. All these kinds of trips that we made were very dramatic in those days, because there weren't that many tourists.

Of course, the shopping, by comparison with later on, was fantastic, because there were so few people in the country, so few foreigners. So, you know, my parents did a lot of carpet shopping and shopping for other artifacts. My mother studied weaving and brocade-making and things like that with Iranian teachers. So it was a very exciting time. I learned a great deal about Persian society, in different ways than I would later on, when I came back as a Foreign Service officer.

Q: Did you ever see any of the political figures of the day give speeches, like the Shah or Mossadegh or anybody like that, in your recollection?

Bolster: No. I was never involved in that. I mean, my father
went to the ceremony, the annual salaam at No-ruz time, when he met the Shah as one of the Embassy officers, in his top hat and tails and all that sort of thing. So I was aware of all that, but at the age of twelve to fourteen, one doesn’t get involved in many of those things. So I really didn’t have that clear an impression of the politics of the day, aside from, as I mentioned, this U.S. support for Iran, that angle.

Q: After you were in the Navy, you went to Foreign Service school?

Bolster: Right.

Q: Then you were trained as being a disbursing officer?

Bolster: Yes, I went through what they called A-100 course, which is a standard introductory course. Then they needed disbursing officers, because they didn’t have enough people. They had just turned a lot of jobs into officer level jobs and they didn’t have enough people that had the skills to fill them. This was just after the Wriston [Henry] program, you know--

Q: Wriston--?

Bolster: The Henry Wriston Commission studied the Foreign Service in ‘54 and how to make it more representative. Or was
that '53?

Q: Early fifties.

Bolster: Anyway, whenever it was. And the final recommendations were that, among other things, we should be more broadly based and recruit people from all over the country. Not have the exams just given in Washington, give them across the country and try to actively recruit people from various states and not make it an Eastern Establishment Ivy League kind of progression through the Georgetown School of Foreign Service and so on.

And a lot of people were moved from staff positions to officer positions. More or less forcibly. I mean, they were just told, if you want to stay in the Service, you're going to become an officer and do this kind of work, and if you don't want to, then we don't have a place for you any more.

Q: What did this involve? Was this like a foreign aid program, disbursing--?

Bolster: Well, I'm just giving the background on the Wriston program now. When I first came in, some of the people I met were people who had worked for the State Department domestically and had never been overseas. And suddenly they had been "Wristonized", as they called it. My Ambassador in Phnom Penh, Wade Trimble, had been a fairly senior person in Washington, but
had never served overseas. He went out to Bonn as DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission] and from Bonn he went to Phnom Penh as Ambassador. That was only his second overseas post, to be Ambassador to a very difficult country and, I mean, dealing with Prince Sihanouk and all the machinations that he was involved in. You know, it was really a tough job to follow all that, especially for a man who was fairly senior and who had just come from Germany, where you had a totally structured political situation. Then you come to Phnom Penh, Cambodia, and try to deal with the mercurial Prince Sihanouk. It was really quite a challenge.

So anyway, against all this background, I was probably in these cohorts of people who were coming in, for the first time sort of recruited from across the country, rather than from Ivy League schools and so on. I looked upon it, as many others did, as an opportunity to come in the Foreign Service as more representative, if you will, of the broadly based Foreign Service than the one that had been there previously, because in the thirties and forties, there’d been pretty much of a--

Q: More exclusivistic?

Bolster: An exclusive club, yes. And if you went to Harvard, Princeton, Yale, et cetera, you had a much better chance of getting into it. If you didn’t, you had a lesser chance. If you
hadn't gone to college, you had no chance. Later, when they gave the exam, it was very democratic. They had the exam before, but the exam was revamped and made much more general. Anyway, it was sort of a new period in the Foreign Service in the early fifties, and by the late fifties it was still being digested. All these changes, and people still talked about, are you a "Wristonee" or did you come in recently? You know, this was sort of the argot of the Service. In fact, if you look in the stud book, the Bio-Register, you see some people came in in the sixties, in the FSO-6, and then when the Wriston program took effect, they made it eight classes, so that people went from six back to seven, for example. FSO-7. And then a few years later again, they went back up to 6. So there were very strange looking career progressions if you look in the Biographic Register.

But anyway, I went off-- because they didn't have enough officer level people, they trained some of us in disbursing work, learning-- not to do it, because obviously you had people to do it, but to supervise it and be responsible for many millions of dollars over the time that you're doing the job at a post.

And so I went out to Phnom Penh. I was one of two people in my entering class of, I think, twenty-six-- only two of us went abroad our first tour, which was our reward for volunteering for this strange duty of being disbursing officer. My colleague went to Havana, Cuba and I went to Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

It was a rather unusual job, but while I was there I requested the chance to do part-time work in the Political
Section. So I did some reporting on the press and so on.

[TELEPHONE INTERRUPTION]

Q: When you were Disbursing Officer, did you funds and things like that? Was that some of the--?

Bolster: I dealt with everything, yes, everything that was--

[TELEPHONE INTERRUPTION]

Q: You were saying what you were doing as a Disbursing Officer in terms of account work?

Bolster: Well, I really paid every bill the Embassy had. I mean, I paid for rental of space, I paid everyone’s salaries, I paid all the bills for any service that the Embassy got. Just anything that was required. I paid bills for certain aspects of the military assistance, when they were certified correct, and so on. So it was quite a wide-ranging job, a rather unusual job to have. And a lot of money, a lot of responsibility. I supervised, I think, a dozen or so employees, and I had an Assistant Disbursing Officer. You were financially responsible for everything you did, until all those payments cleared, which took several years. You wrote thousands of U.S. Treasury and local currency checks over that period of time and had to keep all of your accounts correctly reported back to the Office of Finance, and negotiate with the local banker to work out service,
and all kinds of things.

So, you know, it was quite an interesting job, even though it was, if you will, non-substantive in terms of foreign relations, but still it had its aspects.

Q: You said you also did some work as a political officer?

Bolster: I asked if I could on a part-time basis do some work in the Political Section, and to the extent that I was able to devolve some of my duties onto my assistant and my fairly well-trained staff, I was able to spend some time in the Political Section, reporting on the press; reading French language press and translations from the Cambodian press into French, and then using those to write a summary of press developments, which the Embassy was doing at that time.

So I got a bit of a taste of political work, even though I was doing this disbursing officer job.

Q: Now you went to Tabriz in July, ’61?

Bolster: Right.

Q: From your training?

Bolster: Right.
Q: What were you duties at the Consulate there?

Bolster: Well, we had a fairly small staff. We had about five Americans, as I recall. Five or six. We had a Consul, who was in charge of the post, and a Vice-Consul and a Political Officer, and an Administrative Officer, and a Branch Public Affairs Officer, and an American secretary. That adds up to six.

As Vice-Consul I was in charge of the post whenever the Consul left on official business. And like a typical Consulate, it had all kinds of varied activity. I mean, you could do some political reporting, although the Consul did the lion’s share of that. All economic reporting that was done from the post, all consular work—although it wasn’t much in a place like Tabriz. The administrative job of sort of running the post under the general supervision of the Consul.

When I arrived there, Bill Eagleton was the Consul. He was very actively engaged in researching a book on the Mehhabad Republic, which he eventually published. And so he spent a lot of time in the Kurdish areas and whenever he went off on these trips, I would be in charge. There were a few humorous moments, because the procedure was that the Field Army Training teams, the so-called FAT teams—there were American Field Army Training teams in various parts of Azerbaijan.

Q: Part of Armish-MAAG?
Bolster: Part of Armish-MAAG. There was a Field Army Training team in Mehabad, and there was one in Tabriz—of course a large one in Tabriz—and I think there was one in Kermanshah. Anyway, in various places. And the Mahabad team was obviously valuable to Eagleton, because whenever he passed through there, he could call on them, and whenever they came by, by plane, through Tabriz, if they could give him a ride to Mahabad for another one of his trips researching the Kurdish areas—both for his book and for official duties, keeping track of how the Kurds were doing and all the political issues between the Kurdish tribes and the Iranian government and so on.

The arrangement was that if they could take him on a trip by plane, they would circle the consulate compound twice and then head for the airport. So Bill kept a suitcase packed, and whenever we’d hear this plane coming, we’d rush out and look to see if it was the Armish-MAAG plane. They would circle twice and Bill would run to the consulate residence, grab a suitcase and the consulate chauffeur and off he’d go to the airport. And I would be left in charge, with barely a word of what was going on or any of the duties. So I just had to take over and run the post while he was away.

Which was fine. I mean, I really enjoyed the variety of duties that I had. I particularly enjoyed what came later, which was the land reform program, which started in Maragheh, which was in our consular district. So I was the first person to report officially for the American government on all aspects of the land
reform program—other than the purely political. I mean, the Consul would do the reporting on the larger political issues of land reform, but I did everything else. I reported on what it was like at the ground level: the procedures whereby government officials were coming out to the area to survey a situation, and how they were deciding what lands were surplus, what was going to be confiscated from the owners, and how to divide it up among the peasants.

You know, a tremendous number of issues were coming up and because I spoke such fluent Farsi, I was able to go down there on trips and simply go interview all these people. Visit the villages. Talk to the head man of the village or talk to other villagers and, you know, ask them about their experiences before and during land reform. It was fascinating. I really formed a very good basis, I think, for analyzing what was going on, because I could see all aspects of it.

Now, of course, I didn’t speak Turki, which is the—there’s an Azerbaijan Turki, which is the sort of argot of that area. Nor could I speak Kurdish. So if I got into a Kurdish village, I wouldn’t be able to speak with people there. I couldn’t speak that much Turki, although I learned some words and I could say numbers and some simple concepts. But still Persian was the lingua franca of the area, because an official coming up from Tehran to work on land reform would obviously not know Turki. So he would have to speak to villagers in Farsi and they would, in turn, speak to him in Farsi. To the extent they knew
it. Either polished if they were educated or very rudimentary if they were peasants. But, you know, most people with any education at all would speak some Persian. So it was a pretty easy way to communicate with people. If I needed translation of Turki, then one of the Consulate people with me-- my driver or a consulate political adviser-- could translate from Turki to English.

Q: Who was the Political Officer at Tabriz at this time?

Bolster: Johnson was the Political Officer.

Q: Do you recall his first name?

Bolster: Woodson Johnson.

Q: There was also a public relations person there?

Bolster: A branch Public Affairs Officer, John Clayton, who represented the USIS activity in that whole area. We had branch public affairs officers in each consulate, and they did all kinds of things like sponsoring cultural programs. And they had film teams that would go out and show USIS films to villagers on long swings through the countryside. They’d just go into a village and announce there’d be a movie that night and set it all up and show these films. Some were sort of public health type films.
You know, telling them about how to combat certain diseases. Some were with a certain public affairs message to them, with a slight propaganda tinge to them. But, you know, generally pretty well done. And fascinating to the villagers, who had never-- I mean, a lot of these villagers had never been to a movie. Or if they had, it might have been one time in a town, when they took a trip to the nearby large town or provincial center. But having a truck come to their village and suddenly show movies to the whole crowd, it was quite an experience for some of the people.

So there was a very active program at many levels. I mean, we were contacting everyone from the top government official down through provincial officials, and going off to tour the countryside and going to villages. We had quite an active program there, to really learn a lot of what was going on in the whole of Azerbaijan.

Q: You were there in Tabriz about two years?

Bolster: Just over two years, yes.

Q: What was it like in those days? What were socio-economic conditions like? In a provincial town like that?

Bolster: Well, it was an extremely large city. I think in that period it was somewhere around four hundred thousand people, and yet it had a very small town atmosphere to it, because there just
weren't that many big buildings. The downtown area was quite well organized, paved streets and all that sort of thing, but as soon as you got away from the center, you started getting into unpaved kuchehs, or small alleyways. It was sort of like a farming town in the Midwest, but much, much larger. I mean, the atmosphere was the same. You know, on weekends people came in from the villages to buy things. You'd be jostled along the streets by rather stolid looking peasant types who, you know, just didn't even move aside for you. Generally they used to walk right down the sidewalk going to wherever they were going. As I say, in the sixties it was quite similar to what you would imagine some parts of the Soviet Union would be like. Thousands of illiterate peasants descending on this city for their needs on weekends.

Yet Tabriz had a sort of a cultural cachet from the old days, because in the nineteenth century and on into the early twentieth century each Crown Prince of the Qajar dynasty was sent up to Tabriz for training. Then they had court musicians and court people who gave lessons in history and music and deportment and everything else. It was sort of a training ground for the new leaders.

And they were very proud of their role in the constitutional events of 1907-1909, when the Qajar Emperor of the time was forced to accede to a Constitution, which limited his powers. Of course the Shah always maintained that he was still serving under that same Constitution, but obviously there
was no limitation of his powers, to the extent that it was even envisioned in 1907-1909 affair.

Another little footnote to that was that an American student from Princeton, or graduate from Princeton, had come out to Iran as a teacher at the school in Tabriz, the mission school, became enamored of this constitutional cause while it was under way, and decided to join them, despite orders to the contrary from all his superiors. And he was killed. He looked over a mud wall during one of these skirmishes between rival groups in 1909 and was killed, and his grave was in a cemetery across the street from the Consulate. Every year we used to have Baskerville Day.

We'd go and give speeches about his sacrifice for the cause of the Constitution in Iran and so on. It played well with the locals, perhaps because they were still evoking the period when they had this major role in pushing through the Constitution.

Of course, in the years since 1907-1909 Tabriz has somewhat gone downhill in terms of its importance in the country, and many of the people felt that, that the government—- the Shah or the government, whichever way they wanted to talk about it, but if they were being frank, they would say the Shah thinks nothing of Azerbaijan. He still thinks that we're not really loyal the way most other parts of the country are, because he still keeps in mind that we had the Pishevari regime here when the Russians were controlling Azerbaijan and sort of feels that we weren't totally loyal, and therefore he's not giving us the attention that we deserve. He's not giving Azerbaijan the
attention or the funds that it deserves for development. You know, there was that attitude. Which was one of the reasons why the Shah selected Moragheh or Azerbaijan as an area to start land reform, because there was this perception that not much had been done for that area.

Q: Now around the time you arrived, in mid-1961, I think there was some concern in Washington about political and social instability in Iran generally. I think a few months before Ali Amini had been appointed Prime Minister. From the documents I’ve seen there was some concern that there might have been a military coup against Amini in the early stages of his period as Prime Minister. How much concern was evident to you when you—maybe before you arrived in Iran or when you were stationed in Tabriz? How much evidence of concern did you see about the problem of Iran being unstable politically, that there was a lot of concern about the direction that things might take in the country?

Bolster: Well, at the beginning there wasn’t a great deal of uncertainty, I think, because the perception was that Amini had been appointed because of American pressure. I mean, before I ever went out to Iran, I was reading press stories in our Farsi class and the general impression of the Iranian press was that because of Kennedy’s views on Iran—that it should try and be a progressive country and so on—that we had more or less behind the scenes put the pressure on the Shah and he had agreed to