


Foundation for Iranian Studies

Program of Oral History

Dr. ALI AMINI

INTERVIEWEE: <sup>c</sup>ALI AMINI

INTERVIEWERS: SEPEHR ZABIH, PARIS JANUARY 1983  
HORMOZ HEKMAT, PARIS SEPTEMBER 2, 1986



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DR. ALI AMINI

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Dr. Ali Amini was born in 1905 in Tehran to an aristocratic family. His mother was a daughter of Mozzafareddin Shah Qajar. He completed his secondary education in Tehran and his higher education in Paris.

He served in the cabinets of Qavam, Mossadeq, Mansur, Zahedi and Ala as Minister of Economy. In 1954, he negotiated and concluded the oil agreement with the International Oil Consortium. He has also held the post of Minister of Justice and Ambassador to the United States. Before being appointed Prime Minister in 1961, he had been out of office for a number of years. Following his resignation from this post he was out of favour with the court and out of official office for the rest of his stay in Iran.

Dr. Amini was at the center of Iranian politics for many years in various positions of authority. He was close to and cooperated with some of the leading political figures of the century. After his resignation as Prime Minister in 1962, he was a respected member of the loyal opposition. In the period before the revolution he was in contact with various opposition groups, especially some of the religious leaders. He was, at this time, consulted by the Shah a number of times and was offered the premiership as an attempt to pacify the opposition. His active role in the post revolutionary opposition political activity and his leadership of the Front for the Liberation of Iran have given him an opportunity to be in contact with various exile political groups and he sees himself as an elder statesman well situated to unify and mediate between these groups.

His role in the development of the oil agreement of 1954 is a controversial point in his career and one which is of interest to the students of petro-politics.

As a personage and as one who has held the most sensitive posts in Iran, his memoirs are of considerable interest to the students of contemporary Iranian history.

## PREFACE

This manuscript is the product of a series of tape-recorded interviews conducted for the Oral History of Iran Program of Foundation for Iranian Studies by Sepehr Zabih and Hormoz Hekmat with <sup>c</sup>Ali Amini in Paris, France in January, 1983 and September 2, 1986.

Readers of this Oral History memoir should bear in mind that it is a transcript of the spoken word, and that the interviewer, narrator and editor sought to preserve the informal, conversational style that is inherent in such historical sources. Foundation for Iranian Studies is not responsible for the factual accuracy of the memoir, nor for the views expressed therein.

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مصاحبه کننده

شماره ۱۹۱۲، تاریخ ۱۳۹۱

تاریخ  
126 Ave. Suffren A/B, Paris, 8<sup>e</sup>, FRANCE

موضوع نوار

تاریخ شفاهی ایران

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