

religious edicts and doctrines are completely scientific. That's why his closeness to Bazargan and Nakhshab and those people. And very dedicated by all general kind of conventional definitions of a sincere human being. He was impeccable. Exactly such people could also be very dangerous.

He had two children with the same American wife. He quit his job in the early 1970s. I think it was 1973. He quit his job. He was a professor of physics. He left his wife and children behind and went to Lebanon and joined the Palestinian group, and Imam Musa Sadr. Fundamentally, he became a teacher originally. He wanted to teach physics, mathematics in general. Gradually, he got more and more involved in politics and guerrilla activities of Imam Musa Sadr. He had connections with Iran. I saw him in Iran. In fact, at my sister's house when I returned, we sat together and recollected our memories of the past. He remained fundamentally a very calm, quiet, but incredibly intense person for whom everything ultimately had religious justification or lacked religious justification. A very mystical person.

Q: He was a follower of Khomeini from the beginning?

Farhang: Khomeini really came on the scene very late. These people did not even believe in mar_ja'. Even if they did, it was a theoretical abstraction. They were not Bazargan; they were modernists. They were definitely in the mode of Islamic modernism. Attraction of Khomeini, to even people like Chamran

and Yazdi, was purely political. It was purely political to Bazargan and the rest, except that they did not see any threat. They saw a holy man, a religious man, who is politically useful to them without being a threat or a competitor. This was the realities of their orientation toward Khomeini. They were not followers at all. Chamran considered himself a molla, that he was the source of invitation himself. He was a learned man within his own -- like Bazargan.

I'll tell you parenthetically, when Bazargan met Khomeini in Paris for the very first time, when he came out, they asked him, "What do you think of him?"

He said, "I saw a Shah with a turban on his head." In Paris. That's parenthetic - into the future.

And Khomeini initiated it. Khomeini treated these people with an incredible amount of dignity and deference. Let me give you an example of how -- Not Khomeini, but a similar kind of relationship between mollas and religious modernists of Bazargan, Chamran, Yazdi type. In 1955, 1956, as a high school student in Iranshahr, I used to go to Masjed-e Hedayat on Friday nights with a group of political people. There wasn't much of an activity, but still there were remnants and it was nostalgic. We'd go there and Taleqani is their preacher. He sees folks every Friday night. Thursday night, that is. During the same period, Yazdi and Chamran were students in the University and they had formed an organization, Anjoman-e Islami Mohandesin. Bazargan and Sahabi were the instigators, and Sabbaghiyan, Yazdi, Chamran, Mo'infar were all students. They were the followers. They used

to come to Masjed-e Hedayat as a group. I remember so vividly, so distinctly, that they'd come in like ten of them or twelve of them at once, all wearing tie and very neat like Bazargan.

First of all, Taleqani always knows they're coming. They don't come for prayer or anything, like the rest of us; they come for the speech. When they come, Taleqani always knows they're coming because... Also a friend of my father - not too close, but they used to get together once in a while with a couple other people. They used to smoke opium together. The moment these ten, twelve people entered the mosque, these mollas who were sitting there were so elevated - that is, they get so much prestige and social acceptability from the presence of university students and university professors in their domain. You could see it in their eyes.

For all those years and even until immediately after the revolution, the mollas had a very high view of people like Bazargan and Sahabi and Yazdi and Chamran - theoretically, theologically, as well as politically. That they thought they are much stronger with respect to the popular base that they turned out to be, in comparison with the kind of power that the developed immediately after the revolution.

The attitude of these people toward the mollas were a perception of what they might or might not do in the position of influence has to be seen in the context of what they have experienced in their long relationship with them. Retroactive kind of judgment is historically meaningless. Not only they were

not afraid, but they acted with a great deal of dignity and authority, and not at all in any submissive, timid position.

Q: This was transformed later?

Farhang: Completely, completely. You see, we are talking about the period where people are involved in political struggle in the whole and expectation of accomplishing something and often, really, deep down, feeling frustrated and defeated. The way human beings operate in this kind of context is a very different story than when they are controlling the state and the state apparatus. All societies, all humans, we all go through transformations. It's a definite, distinct period. The past is important and all that, but it is not at all the replica for judging these people, what happened subsequently. They were completely transformed.

Q: Now, people like Qotbzadeh, Chamran, Yazdi, and Bani Sadr, were they interconnected in terms of their activities early on? Or how was it?

Farhang: They were competitors. They could never work together as a group before or after the revolution. Except that because there was no urgent need for them to form a unified group before the revolution, this divisiveness, jealousy, competitiveness, inability to get together, the way I view it, characteristics of the Iranian political culture, which was inculcated in this

group as any other group, except that the destructiveness of this attitude was not pronounced, was not felt, before then because they were scattered enough. Otherwise, they made no attempt. They couldn't, in fact. Bani Sadr came to the States in 1974. Yazdi boycotted his speeches. He asked his friends and followers not to attend Bani Sadr. Bani Sadr, himself, was very critical and sarcastic about what Shari'ati was doing. He was completely a person of monumental ego with all kinds of other characteristics. I don't have any one dimension of reductionist in view of these people. They were very divided. Each was different. Yazdi was an organizer. He was a scientist, and a brilliant student, and a very bright man, very self-centered, and very pragmatic in the American sense. Qotbzadeh was Dash Akol-e Hedayat. For him, intellectualism was a waste of time. I don't think, probably, he ever read a book in his life. He was an agitator and an activist. Give him a project to do mischief, and he's there. In politics, obviously, these people are useful - politics of every society at all times. That's the nature of that. Bani Sadr is a complete anarchist who thinks he already knows the world and there is no reason for him to listen to anyone else. He has it all figured out - completely opposed to organization, totally. He develops a series of one-to-one connections and relationships - some of them very humane, very interesting, very friendly, and all that. Someone else who was also in the same group, a completely different character, was Habibi. If he is capable, he's an extremely powerful man in Iran

today. He's really the chief of the staff today. He has as much power, I would say, in Iran - more so than someone like [John] Sununu in Washington. But whether he has the talent to exercise it I do not know. He was also in Paris. He was the man who could get along with anybody and everybody. And he had a kind of cordial and civilized relationship with all these people.

So, jealousy, pettiness, competitiveness, inability to work together, and all that, divisiveness characterized the political behavior of all these elements, which I could also say characterized the political behavior of the leftists. But it's fascinating that most of the student association, as a group, was much more cohesive and enjoyed a greater degree of solidarity than any other political group. The reason they managed to remain cohesive and unified was because they were not political until the very end.

Q: And the regime didn't seem to consider them very much of a threat?

Farhang: Not at all. They used to go home. Mohsen Nurbakhsh, who is the Minister of Economics and all that, he was an activist. I knew him intimately at UC Davis. A very good student, very studious, but conservative. He invited me to his house, without exaggeration, a dozen times and I never went because I knew that we cannot connect socially. But I liked him politically. He was very civil. He was informed. He always exhibited a respect for pluralism. If Bazargan had remained

Prime Minister, he would have been an important technocrat in the regime. If there was no revolution, he would have been a technocrat in the regime. He would not have moved up as fast, but he would have been. The revolution made it -- When he came to Iran, first he came to see Bani Sadr. No, first he went to see Minachi, who was Minister of Information. He didn't have anything for him. So, he came to Bani Sadr, and Bani Sadr's office and all that was complete chaos. There was no power. There was only name and symbolism. Beheshti got a hold of him, and he was a completely malleable person, but never a committed, religious person. So, whatever objection someone like him might have to the regime, it is not in the realm of suppressing individual liberties and social culture choices. The vast majority of the people who worked with Yazdi remained with the regime. Many people who were associates of Bazargan, also. That's a different story of how people made their choices when the time came to define themselves as opposition or join the crowd.

Q: How did the Muslim students relate to the Confederation of Iranian Student?

Farhang: Totally rejected it. The Muslim Students Association absolutely refused to engage in debates even - not so much for ideological reasons because, toward the end, they were opening up except that, toward the end, everything -- Because they didn't

want to be associated with radical political activists. They used to come to me and say, "We are raising money to reprint Shari'ati's works. Do you know anybody?"

I said, "Well, I know this or that. Let's give him a call and see." This is the kind of activity, for example.

"We want to build a mosque." So, they go and rent an apartment in Sacramento, as they did. Or they rent an apartment in Oakland, as they did.

"In Washington, we want to build a library in association with the mosque."

So, these are activities that they engaged people. Except that they were always involved in doing something very concrete. They also contributed to each other's sense of cultural identity.

In late 1960, suddenly we seen Iranian women coming here wearing chador. Let me give you an example. In 1960, when I first came here, in an average group of students, if somebody wanted to pray, he or she had to hide their ritual and go somewhere quiet. In the late 1960s, they were proud of doing it in front of others because their number had increased so they no longer felt isolated; there was this religious upsurge in Iran; and there was a body of literature. That body of literature was extremely important for the inculcation of political sensibilities, but it is logical. Parenthetically, the article Daryush Ashuri wrote about this, I think is childish. [chuckles]

Q: With this increase in the number of students with Islamic

tendencies, what do you think that it was due to?

Farhang: Due to economic development in Iran and modernization, a new class of lower-middle-class people in land speculation, in import/export. A massive amount of money fused into the Iranian economy. I give you the example of my own sister, that was pretty typical. That is, we had a class of newly-rich, petty - bourgeois who are sending their children to school for the very first time - to college. There's a fundamental difference between these people and the middle-class - the traditional, conventional middle-class. Let's say, for example, in the kind of middle-class involvement that I was raised in, and most of my friends, there was a kind of harmony, a kind of integration, between material possibilities in the amount of money, income, the family had, and the level of cultural sophistication or cultural value, openness, and so forth. It had developed over a long period of time. I would say probably over a period of fifty to a hundred years. Let's say the technocratic elements in Iran, the bureaucratic type, middle-class merchants and so forth, were harmless. The newly-rich, petty bourgeois, in a very short period of time, their economic possibility expanded dramatically. But, culturally, they remained very traditional. It's impossible for cultural orientation to go through a drastic transformation and remain authentic. But it's possible to win the lottery and become a millionaire overnight. Many of these people were exactly the same.

They came to Berkeley because, like many of us who came here, we had to work. Many of them never worked. Economically, they were far better off than the students who preceded them as a group. But culturally, they had the kind of attachments that hardly existed in earlier generations of Iranians coming. A large number came from small towns, from Azarbayjan, from Esfahan, from Yazd. You don't find too many students -- A proportionate number of the students came from middle-class families in Tehran, older families. But not beginning in the late 1960s, due to, in fact, economic success. It produced a kind of alienation that demanded, on the one hand, the desire for attachment to the old and, at the same time, a demand for political participation and all that. So much has been written about it. But they were different in that sense.

End of Interview #1

Q: Let's begin with the 1962 convention in Berkeley and your role in it - how it came about.

Farhang: In the summer of 1962, there was a convention of the Iranian Students Association in Berkeley, consisting of activist Iranians, both from the East Coast and West Coast. I remember the most distinct faces were Shahin Fatemi and Sadeq Qotbzadeh. The reason they had become so prominent in those days was because Ardeshir Zahedi, who was, at the time, Iranian Ambassador in the United States, had refused to extend their visa. This refusal had become a cause for political activities. During the convention, we also demonstrated in front of the Iranian Consulate on Washington Street in San Francisco, demanding the extension of the visa.

But what is interesting, retroactively, is that that particular convention fundamentally consisted of two kinds of people, two general categories: the Tudehis, who were in the minority but, nevertheless, active and influential; and the Mosaddeqis. The Mosaddeqis, as usual, were divided into fragments. There were those who identified with the more, let's say, liberal Khalil Maleki type of nationalism or liberal nationalism, and there were those who were more leftist. For example, I again remember very distinctly that Shahin Fatemi was located in the most leftist part of the spectrum of Mosaddeqis. He used to be very close to the Tudeh elements. Again, another very important and prominent person at the time who was leading the Tudeh activities in the United States was Dr. Parviz

Taherpur, who is still in Los Angeles. Now, he's a very successful [chuckles] real estate man. Probably, he doesn't remember any of this.

Q: Probably.

Farhang: So, this fragmentation -- The interesting thing, again retroactively, was that all of these people in this period who were involved in exiled political activities -- The image of Iran they had was the last days or the last months of Mosaddeq period. Because, invariably, they were politicized during the period. There were very, very few individuals among us who did not have direct experience during the Mosaddeq period. So, when we thought about politics, it was restoration or recreation of the political environment we had witnessed and experienced and intensely identified with. That image, in a sense, dominated our thinking and our behavior.

Later on, when Amini came to power, in Iran there was political activity. The exiles were galvanized, encouraged. The word "exile" is really very inappropriate. It's students who had come abroad to study and the vast majority of whom could not think of staying in the United States permanently, including myself. If someone had suggested to me in 1962 that "You're going to stay here permanently," I would have rejected that as an outlandish suggestion.

During that period, overall, 1962-1963, the re-emergence of

the National Front in Iran, the image of the Mosaddeq period was dominant.

Q: How many people took part in this convention?

Farhang: I would say there were about maybe two hundred and fifty to three hundred people who participated in the convention. It went on for three days. By comparison, the language was extremely mild and moderate - very little, for example, direct attack on the Shah. Giving you a specific example to show the moderate nature of our political orientation was that Ardeshir Zahedi suggested that two or three members of the Association go to Washington and discuss with him about his reasons for refusing to grant extension of visa to Fatemi and Qotbzadeh. The suggestion was accepted, and two people, Hasan Lebaschi and Dr. Moslehpur -- Hasan Lebaschi was brother of the famous pro-Mosaddeq Lebaschi family in Iran. It's interesting that Hassan is in Iran these days, but his brother, Qasem, lives in California. Moslehpur was a pharmacist. He had finished his work in Iran, and he was doing graduate work at UC/Berkeley. The two of them went to Washington. It's fascinating that when they returned, later on, I saw Hasan and talked to him. They came back with a kind of positive image that he really doesn't mean to kick them out of the United States and all that. He's open to change and modification. But I use this as an example of the nature of the activities. It was nothing like what later on turned out to be completely confrontational and polarized in such

a way that this kind of contact would have been perceived as treacherous on the part of the student activists.

Q: The students were not, in fact, seeking a change in the regime at that point?

Farhang: Not at all. Again, when I said they were divided, the Tudeh elements, they had, obviously, theoretical, ideological positions which were anti-regime. But these positions were not articulated as the ideas of members of the convention. They were, for the most part, confused. This was the period that the Tudehis were desperately trying to get back to a more legitimate and cooperative kind of relationship with the pro-Mosaddeq elements. But I would say the work of the convention and the orientation of the students was not anti-regime as such at all. Even Mosaddeq, himself, in his own trials and all that, he didn't say anything against the regime as such. That line was very much followed and respected by the student activists during this early period.

Q: What was the agenda?

Farhang: The agenda was: We want democracy or free elections in Iran, by implication that we want the restoration of legitimate government. You see, the legitimacy of the regime for us, not the regime -- It was a confused kind of situation. The

legitimacy of the Prime Minister or the executive branch was in question, but not the legitimacy of the regime, the monarchy. To the extent that we were political and it was clear what we wanted was that we wanted a return to hokumat-e ganuni, using the legitimate government, which was the vocabulary used by Mosaddeq and his followers in Iran. That was the essence of our position.

There were also some generalized assertions about improvement in the socioeconomic conditions, greater assistance to students who are studying abroad, and all that. But they were aspirational positions. I think, politically, what was significant and interesting was objecting to the absence of freedom, freedom of expression in Iran, and demanding restoration of hokumat-e ganuni.

Q: And this was just prior to the announcement of the six-point program of the Shah. Between this and that announcement, was there any other significant occurrence?

Farhang: The newspapers. We were publishing a newspaper in Southern California, where I was living. Another newspaper, Bakhtar-e Emruz, an English newspaper that Shahin Fatemi edited and published, Iran Nameh. So, it was largely publication and very little non-Iranian involvement or attention to this movement. It was fundamentally limited to publishing newspapers, 'ilamiyyeh, and perhaps organizing a rally or gathering, largely on university campuses - nothing beyond that.

Q: Where did the funding come from?

Farhang: There wasn't really much expenses involved. For the newspapers, we published a magazine called mawj, that I was the editor of the magazine. After publishing five copies, we went bankrupt. [chuckles] We could hardly sell the magazine. There were a number of people who were in better economic positions, who had jobs, university jobs. There were a number of people in teaching or research positions at UCLA, I remember distinctly. Students worked. There was very limited type of funding. The only occasion, in 1962, that we managed to attract a very large audience in Los Angeles and also raise some money was when, for the very first time, in fact -- To my knowledge, it was the very first occasion that the Iranian students decided to invite a singer from Iran for Nowruz. So, in 1962, again, for Nowruz -- it was before the convention -- in Southern California, we invited Marziyyeh. She came and we organized a Nowruz party at the Hilton Hotel in Los Angeles. Every Iranian came. We sold a lot of tickets and made actually some money -- It was the only occasion that we managed to raise some funds. She came here and associated with the students, stayed with the students, and all that. She returned to Iran. There was no problem, which is another indication of the general political orientation of the movement then. Besides that, there was very little activity that required funding. Newspapers were published with the expenses of

certain individuals. I would say Fatemi's family on the East Coast probably contributed money for the expenses of the publication, without any question. The copy sales couldn't be sufficient to pay the expenses. But I don't know the details. The other side, I know that we were bankrupt. [chuckles]

Q: With the announcement of the six-point program of the Shah, what kind of an effect did that have on the students?

Farhang: I would say we followed very much abroad the position of the National Front. I'm speaking of the group I associated with. Even though on a private level, we had some doubts that maybe here is an occasion that we should look upon more favorably, try to understand it and analyze it, and so forth. But let me tell you, as a general rule, at the time, there was very little political sophistication among us. We really didn't know, in my opinion, what politics was. Remember that this is retroactive. So, it was oppositional politics, that you have a set goal, which is to get restoration of a legitimate government and you want free elections; you want free assembly; you want newspapers. These are tangible objectives. But you don't relate these to the larger political issues of engaging in bargaining or negotiation or seeing, for example, the behavior of the other side as a response to your actual or potential importance. To the extent that White Revolution was perceived by the students abroad as something positive. It was explained as an indication of weakness. And that notion fundamentally came, I would say,

from the Tudehi elements of the movement. Since we didn't want to fall behind them, we often adopted these positions and exaggerated or intensified them so that we would not be perceived as mild to the regime and so forth. But, basically, I would say, we followed the internal situation.

Saleh, for example, when he was elected, we celebrated and thought it was a positive movement and all that, but always in the sense of demanding something more substantive toward hokumat-e ganuni and so forth. But I would say there was very little analysis or mature evaluation of developments in Iran. We simply didn't have, in my opinion, the intellectual or the temperamental capacity to do this. It was such a total distrust. Of course, as we all know, there was very little behavior on the other side to change this, but that's an entirely different issue. All these things have to be understood in context. No, we didn't have the political skill or maturity to evaluate these things in a historical, political sense.

Q: How were your contacts with Iran?

Farhang: The contacts were completely unsystematic and disorganized. Individuals had contact, for example. I would say, at least in the United States, the only people who had more direct systematic kind of contact was Fatemi during this period on the East Coast. They were close to Shaygan, who was living here. He was regarded as the gadfly, someone who provided

guidelines and all that. We also invited him to Los Angeles. I was very disappointed with his lack of political depth, even though it was the beginning of my own studies. Nevertheless, I had taken a couple courses and I was majoring in political science. So, I was learning because it was my interest, academic and professional type of interest. On the East Coast, he was really the man they listened to. In my opinion -- again, I don't have any reason to substantiate it -- his relationship with Iran was completely personal. There was no such thing as an organizational link. Just adding it, in 1965, when I went to Iran for the first time since my return, I met Allahyar Saleh because, at the time, I was very close to Behruz Saleh, his nephew who was my roommate. We were living together in California. So, it was through him - not that I knew Saleh. It was through him that I was introduced to his uncle when I went to Iran. I asked him at the time about activities abroad. His response was, "Aga-e Shaygan Anja Hastand," like, "Don't ask me anything."

On the West Coast, I would say an individual like Hasan Lebaschi, or his brother Qasem were very much involved in activities. So, they used to correspond or talk on the telephone. I had some contact with Maleki. I wrote to him a couple of times. He published my letters in 'Elm-o Zendegi' magazine. I also had some contact with the Sosialistha-e Irani dar Urupa, who were also the remnants of Maleki's kids in Europe. They're still there, some of them. Do you remember -- I don't know if you knew him, Dadashpur?

Q: Yes.

Farhang: He was there. Farrokh Dadashpur was there. And another person at the time, with whom I corresponded a couple of times, a physician, lives in Paris. It was another source of contact. But all of these contacts -- it's interesting -- they were rooted in Mosaddeq or immediate post-Mosaddeq contacts which existed in Iran. After years of disruption, they were restored or reconnected abroad. To my knowledge, there was no systemic contact.

Another person who was influential, had conflict with Fatemis, wrote me a letter once to California - Mohammad Nakhshab. He died of a heart attack. He split from the Iran Party in Iran. Did you know him? His background is well-known. He fled from the Iran Party and established the Hezb-e Mardom-e Iran. He was the first person in Iran, to my knowledge, who used the word "Khodaparastan-e Sosialist." In fact, he was the godfather of Shari'ati, except that he was a real Social Democrat. He worked in the UN and actually had a heart attack a year before the Revolution, in New York.

He wrote me a letter once, complaining about the student activities or the Iranian opposition activities. He was saying that "it has become too Fatemized." [chuckles]

He was kind of a party leader. He had some following here. Someone like Qotbzadeh was very close to him. Mostafa Chamran

was very close to him. They were religious Mosaddeqis - very much along the line of Bazargan and Nehzat-e Azadi. But his party actually preceded that. He had some contact with members of his party who were still in Iran, but not in any organized fashion.

So, the contacts have to be seen on the personal level rooted in the past. If I think about it, I can probably remember other individuals, but they were largely in the same category.

Q: Before 1965, when you went to Iran, were the --

Farhang: 1965 was the first time.

Q: Before that 1965 date, were you in touch with the Islamic groups?

Farhang: There was no such -- To the extent that the notion existed, it was represented by Mohammad Nakhshab and Mostafa Chamran or Sadeq Qotbzadeh, except that these people were extremely tolerant. They were representatives of the religious support for Mosaddeq of the pre-1953 period. Our perception of these people was fundamentally very positive, that this belief in religion did not separate them from us in a political sense. We were very different in our social lives. I remember even in Berkeley the secular elements of the 1962 convention. In the evening, we'd go to a bar, go and have a wild night on town. The more religious elements obviously do not join us. But this was

never perceived in the period as something significant politically.

Q: It didn't even effect your personal relationships, friendships?

Farhang: Not at all. In fact, they were on the defensive, I would say. It continued in the States until late 1960s. The religious elements, in their interaction and contact with the secular elements -- even these terms were not used -- they were on the defensive with respect to their practice of religious rituals. I wouldn't be exaggerating to say that, in the United States, up to the mid-1960s, late 1960s, if a religious student, in a general kind of a student gathering, wanted to pray, he had to go somewhere and do it very quietly, and he would prefer not to be seen by others.

Q: Interesting.

Farhang: Right. Not only it wasn't something that you would try to brag about, but it was something that you'd regard as personal and private. The idea that you don't drink because there were some people in the room religious was unthinkable. You do your thing. It was the same thing as we were familiar in our own family.

Gradually, it changed. It changed in many, many ways. More

and more students who came abroad were much closer to the type of religious -- Remember last time in our conversation, we talked about it. On the one hand, the secular movement became increasingly radicalized, ideological. The Maoists and the Fada'iyans and everybody was a Marxist-Leninist on the part of the secular process. The polar position completely opposite of this was the Iranian Muslim Student Association which was completely alienated from this movement. I think toward the very end of the pre-revolutionary period abroad, it was largely non-political in its public behavior, in its public behavior. If we studied the literature -- Let's say much of the literature distributed abroad were lectures of Shari'ati or writings of Bazargan, they were political in the sense of writing in a metaphoric, symbolic, implicit language to communicate and so forth, like Gharbzadegi, but not political in the sense of jeopardizing the position of individuals.

I remember Yazdi gave a lecture about a year before the revolution at UC/Davis. When he wanted to make a reference to the Shah, he used the word "fer'on" that, of course, everybody knew what he was talking about. But I'm using this to say something about the spirit of the period. This polarization, which was very much reflective of what was going on in Iran - very radical, very polarized, except that the radicalism of the religious element was largely cultural. They were totally disconnected from the American socio-culture involvement. They didn't associate with Americans. They were very much interested in getting zibh meat, having their mosque, reading their own

books, having their own gatherings, and so forth, and also an interest in propagating their religious views, very much like now. The people in between -- that is, most of us -- the people who came from a different background, we were a very small minority. The vast majority of the people who were political in the early period, by late 1960s, they were all in their businesses and they had disconnected themselves from politics. Some individuals who had remained either through professional academic reasons or personal idiosyncrasies remained interested. So, if you really wanted to engage in group action or group identification against the regime in Iran, you had to associate either with one or the other. I remember some people in my category, from a social point of view, from a social-existential point of view, the leftists were our friends. We'd get together. They'd invite us to their parties and they'd come to my house. But when it comes to discussing politics, I find these people completely alienated from Iran and life, and engaged in some fictional view of the world - young, but full of themselves and arrogant. They know more about Enver Hoxa and Mao than they know about Iranian history, so there was this division. Yet, socially, these are the Iranians, their families, brothers, fathers. The Islamic side was more modest. We could not really associate with each other, socially. Our children, wives, and husbands, whatever, could hardly relate to each other in a social context. Yet, when it comes to politics, they're using the language, the metaphors, the historical references that are much

closer to the image of politics we had. They're talking about Mosaddeq, Shari'ati, Bazargan, or even Kahsani. Even when you disagree, I'm not necessarily making a normative judgment. The linguistic nature of this situation is extremely important. I would also say that they were far more real with respect to reflecting Iranian society - people, by this time, who had come to see politics, the science of politics. So, there was this division.

For me, when division started, I was constantly between these two groups and all that. When you don't completely associate with one group in Iranian political activities, you end up being an outcast. [chuckles] But you're either with me or against me. That was extremely intense. It was really the most awful period - not only abroad, but also in Iran. In Iran, it was just as bad because I had much more contact - again, informal, personal.

So, when it came to political activities and all that, this is the period that I started getting deeply involved in human rights activities and having a lot of contact with Americans through Amnesty International and other human rights [organizations], particularly in the Bay Area.

At the time, I found the Iranian Muslim Student Association more cooperative, more promising, less threatening as a group than this hodgepodge of radical leftist Marxists-Leninists who were together today, and the next day two brothers were accusing each other of class treason. [chuckles] At the same time, I would say the essential existential division, almost a